Chlorobenzylidenemalonitrile Gas Exposure from A Novelty Personal-Protection Gun by Dong, Christopher & de la Garza, Albert
The California Journal of Emergency Medicine VIII:2 May 2007  Page 57
 Case Report 
Chlorobenzylidenemalonitrile Gas Exposure 
 from A Novelty Personal-Protection Gun
Christopher Dong, MD Kern Medical Center, Bakersfield, CA
Albert	de	la	Garza,	MD	Medical	Corp,	United	States	Army
Correspondence:	Christopher	Dong,	MD,	Kern	Medical	Center
Department of Emergency Medicine, 1830 Flower St., Bakersfield, CA  93305
Email:		chrisemd@aol.com
Keywords:  chlorobenzylidenemalonitrile gas, chemical terrorism, toxic exposure
ABSTRACT
  We  present  an  unusual  case  of  chloro-
benzylidenemalonitrile (CS) tear-gas exposure from the 
unwitting discharge of a personal-protection handgun 
loaded  with  CS  gas.  The  gun  was  in  a  bag  of  toys 
purchased from a local thrift store and was discharged 
by  a  child.  The  responding  paramedic  presumptively 
identified the substance as CS based solely on personal 
experience.  This  recognition  led  to  suboptimal  field 
management of the incident with the paramedic failing 
to  follow  the  standard  operating  procedures  for  an 
unknown chemical exposure. As this was a benign agent, 
there were no serious consequences.  This case highlights 
the pre-hospital and emergency department challenges 
associated  with  the  management  of  an  unknown 
chemical exposure and the potential consequences if the 
chemical is a toxic substance. A methodical approach 
following established protocols can reduce the potential 
for negative outcomes. Review of the literature found no 
other report of CS gas exposure from such a personal 
-protection weapon.
Case Description
A bag of assorted toys was purchased at a local 
thrift store for six children of a household. Upon arriving 
at their home, the children opened the toys and played with 
them. One item (Fig., 2, 3) was a small, gun-like object. 
One of the boys pointed it at another child and pulled the 
trigger. They reported hearing a loud pop and seeing a red 
cloud of smoke shoot out of the gun and believed that this 
discharge hit the second child’s rear thigh area. Occupants of 
the house immediately began to cough and choke. An adult 
  Figure 1.  CS emitting personal-protection weapon 
                   with barrel detached.
caretaker rushed the children out of the house and immediately 
called 911. A call identifying “four people burned by fireworks” 
was entered into the 9 system. This information was relayed 
to the private, contracted ambulance-service communications 
center, and a paramedic unit (EMT-P/EMT) was dispatched 
with only that information. The description of the event, the 
patients’ signs and symptoms, and military experience with CS 
gas led the responding paramedic to believe that the patients 
had been exposed to CS. He decided that field decontamination 
of the patients was therefore unnecessary. Without making radio 
contact, paramedics transported the patients to the Emergency 
Department (ED) of Kern Medical Center, a 50-bed county 
teaching hospital and Level II trauma center. The first hospital 
notification regarding the patients was made when the paramedic 
field supervisor walked into the physicians’ charting area of the 
ED and stated there was a paramedic unit outside the ED with 
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        Figure 2. CS emitting personal-protection weapon 
                        assembled.
     Figure 3.  CS emitting personal-protection weapon 
                       bottom view.
of ED personnel, other elements of care and evaluation could 
be  improved.  We  believe  there  was  insufficient  initial  field 
identification  of  the  agent,  failure  to  request  a  hazardous 
materials  (HAZMAT)  response,  failure  to  decontaminate 
patients before transport, secondary contamination of ambulance 
and paramedic, and inadequate hospital notification regarding 
the incident and patients. 
This  case  also  provides  an  opportunity  to  review 
the physical properties and biological effects of CS, as well 
as  highlighting  an  uncommon  device  for  its  release.  CS  is 
commonly known as tear gas and is classified as a lacrimator 
agent. Developed in 928, it is more potent and less toxic than 
chloracetophenone (CN). It was used in World War I (WWI) 
by the U.S. military and still available on the civilian market 
as “mace.” In 958, CS began to be used as the primary riot-
control agent by the U.S. military and civilian law enforcement 
agencies. 
Chemically, CS is a flammable white crystalline solid 
with a melting point of 93 degrees Celsius. It has a low vapor 
pressure and is heavier than air when in its gaseous state. CS 
is poorly water soluble but readily soluble on organic solvents. 
It is a SN2 alkylator that acts at nucleophilic sites via unclear 
mechanisms,  but  may  involve  the  inactivation  of  enzymes 
such as lactic dehydrogenase and the pyruvate decarboxylase 
system. 
CS is noted to have a pepper-like aroma. Direct skin 
contact  with  CS  causes  irritation  with  complications  that 
include contact dermatitis, bronchospasm, and direct pulmonary 
damage.  Treatment  of  acute  exposure  consists  of  removal 
from further contamination and copious irrigation with water. 
Although noxious, most exposures to CS are relatively benign. 
Symptoms rapidly resolve once exposure stops.,2,3
Early and accurate identification of the offending agent 
is key to the optimal management of a HAZMAT incident. In 
traditional HAZMAT response, one operational tenet is to use 
Taking care to avoid contamination, an ED physician 
made a rapid visual assessment of the situation. Inside the 
ambulance  were  the  transporting  paramedic  and  seven 
patients (one adult and six children). Fifteen minutes after the 
initial exposure, the patients inside the ambulance appeared 
to be otherwise stable and asymptomatic, except for coughing 
and  profuse  tearing. The  transporting  paramedic  said  that 
based on prior military experience he believed the agent was 
CS  gas. The  patients  and  the  paramedic  were  maintained 
in isolation in the ambulance for approximately 0 minutes 
while protective clothing was gathered and decontamination 
equipment was prepared. The patients and paramedic were 
directed into the ED decontamination area and decontaminated 
by ED staff wearing protective clothing consisting of fluid-
resistant gowns, latex gloves, and surgical masks with face 
shields.  Each  patient  was  disrobed  and  copiously  washed 
in  the  decontamination  shower. The  ED  staff  reported  no 
symptoms.
The patients were observed in the ED for four hours 
and expressed no further symptoms. During that time, sheriff 
investigators  inspected  the  device  and  found  the  stamped 
identifier  “ACS-11.” A  sheriff  firearms  expert  determined 
that this was likely an identifier of the active agent, CS gas. 
Because this identification was consistent with the observed 
symptoms,  the  patients  were  subsequently  discharged  in 
satisfactory  condition  with  a  diagnosis  of  acute  CS  gas 
exposure.
DISCUSSION
Evaluation of this case illustrates some educational 
points regarding management of toxic exposures. Although 
some  procedures  were  performed  well,  including  the 
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EMS coordinator would provide oversight of Medical/EMS 
operations  for  the  incident,  notify  and  communicate  with 
affected  hospitals,  assess  resource  needs,  and  coordinate 
transport of patients from the scene. Even if a Med-Alert was 
not activated as in this case, transport of seven patients in 
one ambulance alone would be sufficient cause for hospital 
notification  prior  to  ambulance  arrival. Adding  a  chemical 
exposure  to  the  scenario  should  make  this  communication 
mandatory. If there are concerns about making the notification 
via radio because transmitted information can be intercepted 
by radio scanners, then communicating by telephone should be 
considered. Regardless of field decontamination, early hospital 
notification is essential to allow the ED staff time to prepare to 
receive contaminated and/or symptomatic patients and set up 
for initial or secondary decontamination, if necessary. 
This  emergency  department  is  typical  of  any 
medium-sized  community  ED.  Our  capacity  for  dealing 
with  contaminated HAZMAT  patients,  whether  criminal or 
accidental, is limited.  At the time of this case the only available 
personal  protective  equipment  (PPE)  was  Level  D:  fluid-
resistant gowns, surgical masks with splash shield, and shoe 
covers. The decontamination equipment consisted of a decon 
shower room located adjacent to the ambulance entrance of 
the ED capable of decontaminating two ambulatory patients or 
one non-ambulatory patient at a time. The need for additional 
equipment would have to be met by requests for assistance 
from the fire department. After the initial physician assessment 
in  the  ED  ambulance  bay,  it  was  clear  that  the  paramedic 
supervisor had misspoken when he stated that the patients were 
exposed to “CNS Gas” and that CS or a similar agent was more 
likely based on signs, symptoms, and time frame. Therefore, 
it was believed that the Level D PPE would be acceptable for 
assisted decon activities. Since this incident, a limited number 
of Level C PPE suits and portable decon showers have been 
procured through Homeland Security-related grants. 
While  advance  notification  provides  time  for  the 
receiving  ED  physician  to  assess  the  level  of  protection 
appropriate for the situation, as in this case, such advanced 
warning is not always provided. Neither would it be expected 
if chemically contaminated patients bypassed the EMS system 
and arrived by private vehicles. Therefore, EDs must be able 
to  effectively  and  efficiently  respond  to  such  events  with 
minimal  advanced  notification.  One  of  the  benefits  of  the 
attention being paid to chemical terrorism with equipment and 
training for hospitals is that it can improve preparedness for 
non-terrorism related chemical incidents, as in this case, for 
Kern Medical Center.
The  consequence  of  inadequate  advance  ED 
notification and lack of proper protective equipment can be 
severe. Although an extreme case, the Tokyo subway sarin 
attack  provides  an  illustration  of  the  risk.6  According  to 
Nozaki et al., of the 5 doctors treating patients exposed to 
multiple sources of identification and reference, if possible, 
before developing a definitive action plan. References could 
include the U.S. Department of Transportation Emergency 
Response Guidebook, commercial packaging, manufacturer 
safety  data  sheets  (MSDS),  shipping  invoices,  vehicle 
placards, and computerized databases.  As in this case, a 
chemical release without a readily marked container is not 
well suited to identification by these sources and the use of 
past personal experience can be valuable; however, it should 
not be the only resource used to make definitive management 
decisions. In retrospect, the field paramedic was correct in 
the identification of the offending agent. However, it was 
this confidence in the identification of CS that resulted in 
some of the poor decontamination decisions made. 
While  waiting  for  a  fire  department  HAZMAT 
response to arrive, it would have been appropriate to make 
initial  management  decisions  based  on  the  paramedic’s 
past experience-based presumptive identification of CS by 
directing patients into a well-ventilated area, initiating gross 
self-decontamination,  and  establishing  communications 
with the receiving ED to prepare for multiple symptomatic 
patients from chemical exposure. Upon arrival of police, 
fire or HAZMAT, more detailed situation assessment and 
substance identification could have been performed. If this 
was determined to be a more toxic agent, then appropriate 
decontamination activities in accordance with U.S. Federal 
HAZMAT guidelines and response recommendations could 
have  been  undertaken.4,5  If  the  paramedic’s  identification 
of  CS  was  indeed  correct,  the  HAZMAT  response  could 
then  have  been  downgraded  to  an  appropriate  level. As 
this was a relatively benign exposure, time was available 
for adequate field decontamination of the patients prior to 
placing them into an ambulance, thereby avoiding secondary 
contamination of the ambulance and paramedic. 
Regardless  of  whether  the  paramedic’s 
identification  of  the  chemical  agent  was  correct  or  not, 
multiple symptomatic patients contaminated by a noxious 
and potentially toxic agent were placed in a clean ambulance 
without  being  decontaminated  first,  and  transported.  The 
result was a now-contaminated ambulance and further off-
gassing of the noxious agent into the enclosed environment 
of the ambulance, prolonging symptoms and increasing the 
likelihood of an adverse outcome. The paramedic violated an 
important rule of HAZMAT response: not to become another 
victim. Fortunately, time and ventilation of the ambulance 
and the paramedic were enough to decontaminate both.
Initiation of a HAZMAT response also would have 
prevented the lapse in communication with the ED regarding 
the ongoing incident and transport of chemically exposed 
patients by activating the Kern County Med-Alert System. 
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sarin in Tokyo, 3 (86.6%) reported symptoms as a result 
of the resuscitation of just two victims. Of those treating 
physicians, six (40%) required treatment. Initial treatment 
was rendered without any advance warning about sarin being 
the causative agent, and no special protective clothing and 
equipment were used.7
Another unusual aspect of this case is the delivery 
vehicle of the CS. Although no malicious intent was ever 
proven  in  this  case,  it  appears  that  a  personal-protective 
device  was  somehow  inadvertently  mixed  with  donated 
children’s  toys.  After  lengthy  discussions  with  officials 
investigating this case it was learned that this particular type 
of  weapon  was  commonly  marketed  more  than  20  years 
ago as a personal-protection device (unpublished personal 
communication,  Kern  County  Sheriff’s  Department;  Kern 
County, California ).  According to these investigators, special 
interest magazines in the “detective,” “soldier-of-fortune,” 
and “spy” genre commonly carried advertisements for such 
weapons. After extensive internet searches (keywords: gun, 
CS,  teargas,  personal  protection)  and  inquiries  to  federal 
firearms experts (unpublished correspondence, Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center, U.S. Treasury Department), no 
current sources of such weapons (excluding standard police 
and military riot control devices) could be found.
CONCLUSIONS
A multitude of chemical agents, such as household 
chemicals, industrial materials, agricultural pesticides, law 
enforcement chemical agents (such as CS and pepper spray), 
and chemical terrorism may result in toxic exposures. The 
case presented here illustrates how a seemingly innocuous 
item can cause a toxic exposure with multiple symptomatic 
patients.  It  is  important  to  maintain  a  high  index  of 
suspicion  when  evaluating  any  potential  toxic  exposure. 
In  cases  of  known  or  suspected  toxic  exposures,  existing 
guidelines recommend identification of the toxic agent, early 
notification to the receiving ED, use of personal protective 
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equipment  and  adequate  decontamination.  While  in  this  case 
several pre-hospital system failures allowed for the transportation 
of chemically contaminated patients to an ED without notification 
prior to their arrival, it is functionally similar to the unannounced 
arrival of contaminated patients arriving by private transportation, 
a scenario every ED must be able to handle. It is in everyone’s best 
interest to adhere to strict isolation, decontamination, and protective 
clothing/equipment procedures. Failure to do so can place us all 
at risk: emergency responders, emergency department and hospital 
personnel, and the community at large.
REFERENCES